

Early Entry and Trademark Protection – An Empirical Examination of Barriers to Generic Entry

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Abstract

Examining the joint impact of early entry and trademark protection, we investigate generic entry deterrence in pharmaceutical markets. Patent holders attempt to circumvent the loss of monopoly power by authorizing generic entry prior to patent expiry. Competition in off-patent markets may be adversely affected, especially if early entrants build brands. Estimating probit, bivariate and trivariate probit models, we show that early entrants' use of trademarks deters generic entry. With an average reduction of the entry probability by 7%, the effect is sizeable but not large enough to impair generic entry in the high-revenue markets which early entrants target.

Keywords: Generic Entry, Early Entry, Trademarks, Pre-emption.

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1 Introduction

Patents grant innovators in pharmaceuticals monopoly rents for a limited time frame. By authorizing generic entry prior to patent expiry, patent holders attempt to circumvent the loss of monopoly power. Competition in off-patent markets may be adversely affected, especially if early entrants build brands. The study investigates the issue of generic entry deterrence examining the joint impact of early entry and trademark protection. We have assembled a dataset comprising pharmaceutical market, exclusivity and trademark data for the German pharmaceutical market which is the second largest generic drug market in the world. Estimating probit, bivariate and trivariate probit models – where the latter two models account for the endogeneity of the early entry dummy regressors –, we show that early entrants’ use of trademarks deters generic entry. With an average reduction of the entry probability by 7%, the effect is sizeable but not large enough to impair generic entry in the high-revenue markets which early entrants target.

As blockbuster drugs lose patent protection and drug pipelines have run dry, “Big Pharma” seeks ways to limit profit erosion following generic entry (Economist, 2008). One practice has become the introduction of a generic version of the original drug prior to the loss of exclusivity – typically patent expiration–, either through a subsidiary or licensee partner (early entry). Early entry occurs frequently in many pharmaceutical markets throughout the world but no recent and comprehensive, empirical evidence has been established yet, to determine whether early entry delayed or deterred independent generic entry (Berndt *et al.*, 2007a). First-mover advantages have, however, been shown to be important in the generic market segment (Caves *et al.*, 1991; Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; Hollis, 2002). Early entrants often pursue a product differentiation strategy, i.e. they register trademarks and build brands for the generic drugs they launch (branded early entry). What bearing trademarks have on subsequent generic entry in this particular context is an important and yet unresolved question that requires investigation. For the empirical analysis, a unique data set has been created by a matching pharmaceutical market data, exclusivity data – patents and supplementary protection certificates (spc)¹ – and trademark data from the German patent and trademark office. 79 substances² experienced a loss of exclusivity between 2002-2007. By the end of 2007, generic firms entered in 49 markets, resulting in a total of 767 market entries by generic firms. Of the 49 markets, 16 were affected by early entry. Early entrants in turn embarked on a trademark strategy in 6 markets that gave opportunity to enter.

The distinctive features of competition in off-patent drug markets have attracted the attention of various economists. Previous empirical studies prove pre-entry market size (Morton, 1999; Saha *et al.*, 2006), firm and drug characteristics (Morton, 1999), the brand-name drug’s goodwill stock (Hurwitz and Caves, 1988; Hudson, 2000) as well as pharmaceutical price regulation (Danzon and Chao, 2000; Moreno-Torres *et al.*, 2007) to be important influencing factors of generic entry. Few empirical studies (Hollis, 2003; Reiffen and Ward, 2005a;

¹A certificate that allows for an extension of market exclusivity for up to 5 years after patent protection which – depending on the life cycle of the drug – is granted by the national patent office.

²Throughout the paper the term substance is equivalently used for mono-substance, i.e. a substance that contains one active ingredient only. As the correct allocation of all relevant patents and supplementary protection certificates to a mono-substance is not trivial, this analysis focuses on mono-substances.

Berndt *et al.*, 2007a,b) explicitly deal with early entry and its potentially anti-competitive effect on generic entry. The conclusions drawn differ, and most of the empirical evidence brought forward is still descriptive in nature. The literature on generic entry has so far not touched on the subject of generic product differentiation despite the apparent relevance of trademarks for generic firms (von Graevenitz, 2006), in particular early entrants. Trademarks have been shown to be positively correlated with sales and market share (Griffith and Webster, 2004; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006), i.e. they appear to be a means of enhancing market positions. Given that generic advertising is rare (Scherer, 2000; Morton, 2000), we make use of trademark data to appropriately address product differentiation efforts on parts of early entrants, and to eventually disentangle the impact of early entry and trademark protection – two potential, likely complementary barriers to generic entry.

Estimating a probit model, recursive bivariate and recursive trivariate probit model, we show that early entrants' use of trademarks deters generic entry. First mover advantages alone do not explain entry deterrence. Treating early entry or branded early entry as exogenous variables (probit model) could give rise to a selection problem and inconsistent estimates if early entry or branded early entry occurred in markets that are more attractive than given market characteristics suggest. Bivariate and trivariate probit estimates provide no evidence for selection of this kind. The effect of branded early entry is significantly negative in all specifications, reducing the probability of generic entry by 7% on average. With an average marginal effect of 12% pre-entry market size is the dominant drive of generic entry, suggesting that anticipated branded early entry will not deter generic firms from entry into the high-revenue markets that early entrants focus on. The number of off-patent substitute active ingredients has a negative impact on entry. In turn, firms' therapeutic and drug form experience influence generic entry decisions positively.

The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of previous empirical work on generic entry within the realms of early entry and product differentiation. It also outlines empirical results on the economic relevance of trademarks. Main aspects of the generic drug entry regulation and specificities of the German generic market are presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data and develops the empirical model. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Concluding remarks follow in Section 6.

2 Literature Review

Early entry is not a new phenomenon, not in Europe or in the USA. Nevertheless, few empirical studies deal, with early entry – also known as authorized, branded or pseudo-generic entry – and its potentially anti-competitive effect on generic entry. However, first generic entrants have been shown to have long-lasting advantages over subsequent entrants (Caves *et al.*, 1991; Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; Hollis, 2002). Not only can the first generic entrant serve the market for a longer period of time – with fewer competitors and higher generic profits right after patent expiration – but it can also capture and sustain a substantially larger market share over a period of several years.

Hollis (2003) argues that patients' unwillingness to switch between medications (even if the only difference is the label), search and "persuasion" costs on parts of doctors, and the additional administrative costs of pharmacies when stocking several (identical) generic drugs result in switching costs. He notes that switching costs are certainly not enormous, but not easy to overcome, either. First, there is little room for product differentiation given that generic drugs are therapeutically equivalent. Second, prices are matched as soon as one entrant lowers the price, resulting in overall little price dispersion³ and only a transitory gain in market share when prices are cut. Based on previous empirical evidence showing first-movers' advantages and the dynamics of generic competition, he concludes that the introduction of brand-controlled pseudo-generics in Canada substantially lowered generic firms' expected profits and thus, incentives to enter. Morton (2002) examines the motivations of US pharmaceutical firms in the 90s to integrate generic activities. She finds no statistically significant synergy effects that would explain integration: generic entrants belonging to the cooperation that manufacture the original drug are not more likely to enter, to enter faster or to affect the number of generic entrants in a market. Given that the timing of brand-controlled generic entry – pre- or post-patent expiry – is not accounted for in her analysis, the last result should not be generalized. The goal of the paper is to explain specialization tendencies among pharmaceutical firms' activities and not to test for strategic entry deterrence. She notes, however, that discouraging generic entry could have been one reason why US pharmaceutical firms integrated generic activities in the 90s.

Reiffen and Ward (2005a) analyze the motivation of original drug manufacturers in the USA to introduce authorized generics pre-patent expiry, explicitly dealing with entry deterrence. Based on structural estimates from earlier empirical studies (Caves *et al.*, 1991; Reiffen and Ward, 2005b), they calculate the effect of authorized generic entry on generic industry profits and the number of generic entrants in equilibrium, which in turn affects generic and brand prices, and eventually original drug producers' profits. Their calculation shows that the anticipation of authorized generic entry crowds out between 1.7 to 2.4 entrants depending on market size. Reiffen and Ward (2005a) conclude that original drug producers introduce authorized generics in large markets fueled by rent-seeking motives, i.e. to capture generic profits without substantially affecting the number of generic entrants and generic prices. In small and medium-sized markets on the contrary, entry deterrence motives play a role as the impact on the extent of generic entry and prices is relatively large.

Recent evidence on entry deterrence and consumer welfare effects of authorized generic entry in the USA has also been provided by Berndt *et al.* (2007a,b). In both studies, the effect of authorized generics on the filing of ANDAs⁴ with a paragraph IV certification (claim of patent non-infringement or invalidity) is examined. The first generic firm to file an ANDA with a successful paragraph IV certification is granted a 180-day exclusivity period where no other generic manufacturer (except for authorized generics) is allowed to enter the market with the same version of the drug. These studies look at the change of generic entrants' incentives to enter early, not necessarily at the decision to enter or not, or related, the extent of generic entry. Berndt *et al.* (2007b) point out, that besides authorized generic entry, several

³Generic prices in are typically clustered around a certain "cut-off value" such as a reference price. A reference price is the maximum price the statutory insurance plan covers and reimburses.

⁴Abbreviated New Drug Approval: application process for generic entrants in the USA, where therapeutic equivalence to the original drug and quality of the manufacturing process has to be proven.

factors may limit the profitability of the 180-day exclusivity period.⁵ They also show that in spite of the increase in authorized generics since 2003, there is little change in the total number of paragraph IV certifications, paragraph IV certifications per drug, and timing of filings relative to approvals of new chemical entities. Thus, based on a review of descriptive statistics, they argue that authorized generic entry and its recent increase have not delayed generic entry in the USA. The conclusions drawn in previous studies differ, much of the empirical evidence brought forward is still descriptive in nature, such that potential endogeneity issues with regard to early entry decisions are not accounted for.

Previous empirical work on generic entry has focused on the product differentiation activities of original drug producers, namely pre-patent expiry brand advertising (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; Morton, 2000). The generic entry literature has so far not touched on the subject of generic product differentiation despite the apparent relevance of trademarks for generic firms (von Graevenitz, 2006), in particular early entrants. Trademarks have overall attracted little attention from researchers, compared to other intellectual property rights such as patents. The studies by Griffith and Webster (2004); Greenhalgh and Rogers (2006) are among the first to contribute empirical research on the value of trademarks (Griffith and Webster, 2004; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006) demonstrating a positive correlation between trademarks, firms' sales and market share. Given that generic advertising is rare (Scherer, 2000; Morton, 2000), a closer look at generic firms' trademark activities is warranted. In the context of generic entry deterrence, we examine early entrants' trademark activities and their additional impact on subsequent independent generic entry.

3 Regulatory and Competitive Setting

With a market size of about €4.5 Bn. and a market penetration of 22% as of 2007, Germany is the second largest generic market in the world and the largest in Europe. Thus, it is an important market to examine closely, with respect to early entries and trademarks. Drug expenditures have steadily increased in Germany over the last couple of years. In the German statutory health-insurance system⁶ alone drug expenditures amount to €25.6 Bn.⁷, comprising the third largest cost factor. Given the demographic development in Germany, this trend is likely to persist. In order to limit the growth in medical expenses, several counteractive regulations have been introduced since 2000. Initiatives aim at creating cost awareness on parts of all actors in the healthcare system, and promote the use of high-quality, less cost-intensive medications such as generic drugs. Generic drugs are therapeutically equivalent or bioequivalent to off-patent, original drugs. They have the same active ingredient, identical quality and performance characteristics, the same strength and the same or a similar route of administration. Generic drugs are typically offered at a substantial price discount⁸ as a consequence of price competition and lower R&D outlays. No safety and ef-

⁵Multiple entrants are awarded 180-day exclusivity given they apply for the same dose at the same day.

⁶The statutory health-insurance plan covers about 85% of the German population.

⁷BPI Pharma-Daten 2008; see also Commission (2008), p. 26.

⁸Generic price discounts are in the range of 20-80% of the original drug's price (WHO, 1999).

ficacy tests have to be conducted, only the less cost-intensive bioequivalence studies⁹. An increase in generic substitution has been achieved through the *Aut-idem* regulation which was introduced in 2002. If doctors have not excluded substitution, the pharmacists generally has to sell one of the three cheapest generic alternatives to the patient. If a more expensive product is sold instead, the pharmacist will have to incur the extra cost, i.e. the difference in price. Ever since 2004, dispensing fees on prescription drugs¹⁰ consist to a great extent of a fixed component. The pharmacists receive a fixed amount of €8.10 on each medical product sold, plus 3% of the product's retail price. As a result, incentives to sell high-priced, identical drugs have been reduced. In the same year, reimbursement practices were also altered. Patients covered by statutory health insurance now have to make a co-payment for each drug product they purchase. The co-payment amounts to 10 % of the retail price, the minimum contribution is €5 and €10 is at the maximum. As most drugs are sold in packages priced below €50, patients are often inclined not to search for a cheaper drug with the same active ingredient (Accenture, 2005).

Given the nature of price competition, first-mover advantages are eminent in the generic market segment. Prices on generic drugs are indirectly regulated through reference prices.¹¹ In addition to the co-payment that patients covered by statutory health insurance must make, they receive a reimbursement up to the reference price only. As of July 2006, co-payments become obsolete if a drug product is priced 30% or more below the reference price. As a consequence, generic firms often set prices close to the reference price or 30% below¹², such that little price dispersion can be observed. Since April 2007, rebate contracts have been authorized and promoted, causing a major upheaval in the pharmaceutical industry. Statutory insurance providers may put out to tender several drugs and contract with the generic or pharmaceutical manufacturer that is able to offer the lowest price. Then, pharmacists are to provide the patient with the firm's drug that their insurance has contracted with. Except for rebate contracts, previous regulations seem to have created few incentives on parts of doctors, pharmacists or patients to switch between identical generic drugs as long as the price difference is a minor one. This may explain why first-mover advantages are also said to be substantial in the German generic market segment (Raasch, 2007).

Besides the advantages that generic first-movers have, there seem to be additional advantages of product differentiation. Generic drugs are most frequently marketed as INN-generics, i.e. the international-non-proprietary name (INN) of the active ingredient and a company suffix identifies the product. Some generic drugs are, however, sold under a new trade name which a trademark has been registered for. A trademark is an intellectual property right that is valid for 10 years and can in contrast to a patent, theoretically be extended indefinitely long. According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, "a trademark is a distinctive sign identifying certain goods or services as those provided by a specific person or enterprise". This comprises inter alia words, sounds, colors and graphics that have a distinguishing feature. Generic firms have been found to actively protect trademark portfolios and

⁹Generic manufacturers eventually prove in bioequivalence studies that the rate and extent of absorption of the active ingredient is identical to that of the reference drug.

¹⁰Around 78% of pharmaceutical sales are made on prescription drugs (BPI Pharma-Daten 2008).

¹¹To secure fair competition practices, manufacturers are prohibited from giving discounts in kind to pharmacies since 2005. Financial rebates are restricted to non-prescription drugs.

¹²AOK Press Release June, 2006 (accessed Dec 11th 2008); see also Accenture (2005).

oppose trademark applications (von Graevenitz, 2006). Original drug producers in Germany also often cooperate with generic firms in order to optimize the product life cycle of their drugs.¹³ Early entries, where a generic version of the original drug is marketed through a generic subsidiary or licensee partner pre-patent expiry, occur on a frequent basis.¹⁴ The data at hand reveals that licensing was the preferred mode to arrange for an early entry between 2002-2007, and that early entrants often pursued trademark activities. In any case, the ultimate goal is to enter early enough – prior to patent or spc expiration – to capture and hopefully sustain a large market share in the long run. On the one hand, such a strategy lowers the expected profits of subsequent generic entrants and could thus potentially discourage entry.¹⁵ On the other hand, it reduces the original drug producer’s profits during the exclusivity phase. Original drug producer effectively face a trade-off between allowing for own product cannibalization and obtaining a possibly large share in the future generic market segment. The optimal timing of an early entry is undoubtedly crucial. Early entrants’ trademark activities suggest, however, that generic firms are also well aware of the competitive edge that trademarks may additionally give.

Given the lengthy generic entry process where firms are uncertain about competitors’ entry decisions, generic firms can only anticipate early entry and the likelihood that early entrants embark on a product differentiation strategy. Independent generic entry is generally permitted as soon as the original drug goes off-patent, i.e. 20 years after patent application. Original drug producers have the additional possibility to apply for a supplementary protection certificates which guarantees market exclusivity to the original drug producer for up to five years when granted by the national patent office. As noted earlier, generic drug manufactures do not conduct safety and efficacy but bioequivalence studies which take on average 2 years. In its abridged application for market approval, the generic firm refers to reviews of experts and clinical test results that were obtained in the course of the original drug’s approval process. According to current law, the generic firm can access this type of data without notice or permission of the original drug producer eight years after the original drug’s market entry¹⁶ (data exclusivity period).¹⁷ Thus, generic firms can start conducting bioequivalence studies while the reference drug’s patent protection is still valid (“working under patent”) and commit no infringement doing so given data exclusivity has elapsed. Not before 10 years after the original drug’s market entry, the generic drug is allowed to be marketed (“marketing exclusivity”), though. Moreover, if the original drug producer files an application dossier for at least one additional indication within 8 years after market entry, the original drug producer’s market exclusivity period is extended for another year (8+2+1-Rule). A central application procedure has increasingly been used by generic firms that sought market approval between 2000-2007 (Commission, 2008). The centralized procedure

¹³See also Commission (2008), p. 11.

¹⁴With the permission of the original drug producer (patent holder) a generic drug can be approved at any time before patent or spc expiration.

¹⁵Of course, original drug producers have other options to cope with the threat of generic entry, such as to obtain a second patent for a reformulation (second generation products).

¹⁶Given time and cost-intensive clinical trials and a lengthy approval process, market entry of the original drug typically occurs 10-12 years after patent application.

¹⁷With the implementation of the *Bolar provision* in German law, “working under patent” became legal. For applications filed before November 2005 the data exclusivity period amounts to 10 years in Germany.

is optional for generic firms and has the advantage that a community market authorization is obtained at once. Applications are submitted at the *European Medication Evaluation Agency (EMA)*, which evaluates the application and gives a recommendation to the European Commission within a period of approximately 270 days, which finally grants market approval and informs the applicant. In summary, generic firms decide upon entry into a market roundabout 2-3 years prior to loss of exclusivity¹⁸ and actual entry (WHO, 1999). Due to the disclosure¹⁹ of generic applications dossiers, generic firms effectively sunk entry costs simultaneously and can only form expectations about competitors' actions.²⁰

4 Data & Methodology

An empirical examination of the effect that early entries and trademarks have on independent generic entry requires the use of diverse data sets and sources. A detailed description of the data set construction and a data overview is given in the next sub-section. A motivation and presentation of the empirical model follows.

4.1 Data Set

Through a matching of national pharmaceutical market, exclusivity and trademark data, a unique data set has been created tracking substances' losses of exclusivity and generic entries between 2002-2007. *Insight Health* provides pharmaceutical market data for the time period 1999–2007, in addition to data on patents and spc's²¹. The pharmaceutical market data comprise information on drugs²², medical products and the retail forms that are available. Additionally, they give information on manufacturers, prices, rebates in kind and the turnover and revenues that manufacturers in the German retail market generate. As price, turnover and revenue data are available on a monthly basis for the years 2002 to 2007 only, the analysis is geared towards this time period. Moreover, it is focused on human medications and substances that contain one active ingredient only. The analysis is confined to data on retail revenues, i.e. the wholesale and direct purchase transactions of public pharmacies. Given data constraints, hospitals sales are neglected. In Europe, the turnover generated by prescription medication is significantly larger in the retail segment – approximately three times larger in 2007 – compared to the turnover generated by the hospital channel (Commission, 2008). Thus, for the vast majority of substances in this study (prescription drugs), retail revenues provide nevertheless a sufficiently reliable measure.

¹⁸Expiry of patent protection (possibly extended through a spc), data and marketing exclusivity.

¹⁹See also Commission (2008), p. 15.

²⁰Entry costs comprise the costs of conducting bioequivalence studies – \$ 40.000-150.000 (WHO, 2005), market approval fees – at the EMA, an annual fee of €21.700 in addition to a basic fee of €94.100 (Commission, 2008) – and legal costs in the event of litigation, settlements etc..

²¹*Insight Health* has obtained patent and spc data from national patent offices since 2005. Additional data sources were accessed in order to complement patent and spc information where necessary.

²²Strength, drug form and therapeutic field(s) of indication are specified. The drug form classification follows the New Form Code (NFC) Classification established by the *European Pharmaceutical Market Research Association (EphMRA)*, the classification of therapeutic fields in turn rests upon the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classification System which was introduced by the WHO in 1976.

The unit of observation is the market entry decision of a generic firm. Given information on the date of generic firms' retail form launches, we can identify those substances which possibly experienced generic entry for the very first time between 2002-2007. Thus, we obtain a primary indication for patent or spc expirations. In total, 69 substances were found that potentially experienced a loss of exclusivity. For a validation of potential patent and spc expirations, pharmaceutical market data and exclusivity data were finally merged. The exclusivity data set was generated by matching patent and spc data from *Insight Health*, with a restriction of the data to mono-substances, EP and DE patents, and to market authorizations and spc extensions in Germany. Based on information on the date of substances' patent and spc expirations, 65 substances were in turn found to have experienced a loss of exclusivity between 2002-2007. Exclusivity data provide additional information on patent holders, originators, the date of patent and spc application, the date of first market approval and a list of various (international) trade names²³ the substance was marketed under. Many of the 69 substances that had been identified to have experienced generic entry for the very first time between 2002-2007 were also found among the 65 substances that either lost patent or spc protection in the according time interval. Through an extensive review of additional data sources²⁴ exclusivity information was complemented if missing, and validated. Additionally, the consistency of generic entry data and exclusivity data was checked upon. The date of first generic entry, for instance, was compared with the date of patent expiration. If generic entry occurred before patent or spc expiration, further investigations were carried out to find evidence for early entries or patent invalidity cases that would explain entry prior to the official date of patent or spc expiration. At last, the data was matched with trademark data based upon the correspondence of product names and trademarks.²⁵ Trademark data has been obtained from the German patent and trademark office (*DPMA*) and gives inter alia information about the date of trademark registration and publication, the trademark owner(s) and the trademark's Nice classification²⁶. Trademark data shall be used to address product differentiation efforts on parts of early entrants. Data on advertising expenditures in the pharmaceutical industry are very difficult to come by, with the consequence that there is currently a lack of such data. Given the relevance of trademarks for German generic firms and the fact that generic advertising²⁷ is limited (Scherer, 2000; Morton, 2000), the lack of advertising data is not a severe constraint. Trademark activities will serve as a sufficiently reliable proxy for generic firms' product differentiation efforts instead.

In total, 79 substances were identified that experienced a loss of exclusivity between 2002-2007. By the end of 2007, generic entry had occurred in 49 markets out of which 16 had been affected by early entry. In six of these cases early entrants had pursued a branding

²³A comparison of the listed trade names with the product name (as given in the pharmaceutical data set) facilitated another validity check of the pharmaceutical market and exclusivity data match.

²⁴E.g. the esp@cent patent database, the FDA Orangebook, and the PATDPASPC database.

²⁵Moreover, it was verified that trademark owner and producer (or its parent firm) coincide.

²⁶The Nice Classification is based on a multilateral treaty – the Nice Agreement Concerning (1957) – and is administered by *WIPO*. It serves as an international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks, and currently describes 34 classes of goods and 11 classes of services.

²⁷Direct advertising of prescription medications to consumers is forbidden in the European Union.

strategy and had registered trademarks accordingly. The fact that several entry opportunities attract no generic entry is not unusual (Morton, 1999; Hollis, 2003), as generic entrants focus on high revenue markets (Commission, 2008). Table 1 provides an overview of the 79 entry opportunities arising between 2002-2007. It outlines important characteristics of the markets that were affected by generic entry, early entry and “branded” early entry: pre-entry market size (substances’ market size in € Mio., two years prior to loss of exclusivity and evaluated at producer prices), the number of generic entries that occurred by 2007, the number of therapeutic fields substances are used in²⁸, and the number of drug forms or routes of administration²⁹ which are available.

Table 1: Generic Entry Opportunities (2002-2007)

	<u>Markets</u>	<u>Pre-Entry Market Size</u>		<u>Entries</u>	<u>Indications</u>		<u>Drug Forms</u>	
	N	Mean	Median	N	Mean	Median	Mean	Median
Generic Entry	49	48.3	33.3	767	1.14	1	3.18	3
<i>No Early Entry</i>	33	44.7	26.2	445	1.09	1	3.21	3
Early Entry	16	55.6	39.8	26	1.25	1	3.13	2.5
<i>With Trademark</i>	6	73.9	49.4	9	1.16	1	3.00	2.5
<i>No Trademark</i>	10	44.6	39.8	17	1.30	1	3.2	2.5
No Generic Entry	30	0.55	0.22	0	1.06	1	1.67	1
Total	79	32.1	14.7	793	1.11	1	2.61	2

Very small markets do not experience any generic entry. Early entrants in turn appear to focus on high revenue markets, in particular when trademark-protected products are launched. On average there tend to be more routes of administration for substances that attract generic entry or early entry compared to markets where no entry occurs. Differences with respect to substances’ therapeutic applicability are either minor or non-existing.

We can track firms that decided to enter a market through the observation of generic entries. On the contrary, we remain agnostic about those firms which refrained from entry. For an examination of generic entry decisions, negative entry decisions (“zero-entries”) need to be accounted for as well. According to the approach of Morton (1999), sets of potential entrants are constructed for each substance in order to deal with this problem of partial observability. The pharmaceutical data set provides information on the names of the various firms that supplied the German pharmaceutical market between 1999-2007. After the exclusion of pharmacies from the data set, 991 firms remain. A further restriction of entry candidates is warranted as one would not expect all 991 firms to decide upon each of the 79 entry opportunities. Generic firms that enter markets have on average 419.3 (Median: 216.3) retail forms in their portfolio at the time entry opportunities come up. By restricting the set of potential entrants to manufacturing firms (no re-import) with a portfolio of at least 50 retail forms – a soft constraint –, the number of firms is reduced to 198. These 198 firms manufactured 89.4% of all retail forms available on the German market between 1999-2007,

²⁸Therapeutic fields are classified by the ATC System at the second level of aggregation (ATC2).

²⁹Routes of administration are classified by the NFC System at the second level of aggregation (NFC2).

of which 184 firms were also found to have generic drug portfolios³⁰. As active manufacturers with mostly some generic market-orientation, these 198 firms represent potential market entry candidates. Out of these 198 companies the first set of potential entrants is created for each substance by including only those firms that are active at the time exclusivity expires, i.e. they must have launched a positive number of retail forms by that time. Set 2 restricts the set of potential entrants further to those firms that are not only active but also prove to be experienced in the therapeutic field(s) the substance is used in, having marketed a positive number of retail forms in the relevant therapeutic field(s). The last set of potential entrants, is created by limiting the firms in set 2 to those firms that additionally have expertise in manufacturing the route(s) the substance is administered in (positive number of retail forms marketed in the relevant drug form(s)), at the time exclusivity is lost. Sets of potential entrants are assigned to each and every substance, such that three different samples are created and a verification and evaluation of the robustness of results is feasible. Table 2 provides an overview of the three sets of potential entrants³¹ and generated data sets.

Table 2: Sets of Potential Entrants

	Data Set 1	Data Set 2	Data Set 3
Definition	All firms with a portfolio of at least 50 retail forms, active at the time of loss of exclusivity (no Re-import).	Firms in Data Set 1, experienced in the relevant field(s) of indication (ATC2).	Firms in Data Set 2 with expertise in manufacture of the relevant route(s) of administration (NFC1)
Potential Entrants	Total: 220 Mean: 197.4 Median: 198	Total: 203 Mean: 57.6 Median: 56	Total: 200 Mean: 50.8 Median: 52
Generic Entries	Total: 767 Mean: 15.7 Median: 14		
“Zero-Entries”	Total: 14825 Mean: 187.7 Median: 191	Total: 3781 Mean: 47.9 Median: 42	Total: 3243 Mean: 41.05 Median: 38
Sample Size (N)	15592	4548	4010

With an increasing limitation of the total number of potential entrants from data set 1 to data set 3, the average and median number of potential entrants each substance attracts declines. The same logic applies to the number of “zero-entries” and sample size. In total 767 generic firm entries are observed, looking at the 49 markets that eventually attracted generic entry. Substances were affected by 15.7 generic firm entries on average.

³⁰Since the 96 firms that actually entered markets between 2002-2007 had no generic drug portfolio prior to loss of exclusivity in 10 instances (8 company foundations and 2 business expansions to the generic market segment), we do not exclude firms with no generic drug portfolio from the sets of potential entrants.

³¹Whenever firms enter which are not tracked in the set of potential entrants, the total number of potential entrants increase accordingly, cp. data set 1, 2 and 3.

4.2 Empirical Model

Based on the three cross-sectional data sets, the impact of early entries and early entries in interaction with trademarks, will be examined. As first-mover advantages are eminent in the generic market segment, early entries have been argued to diminish the expected profitability of entry. Thus, early entry is assumed to deter subsequent, independent generic entry if anticipated by potential entrants. Trademarks, in turn, have been shown to be positively correlated with sales and market share, i.e. they turn out to be a means of strengthening market positions. Along these lines of reasoning, trademarks possibly intensify the deterrence effect of early entry on independent generic entry. Again the underlying assumption is that potential generic entrants anticipate correctly that some early entrants will embark on a product differentiation strategy. The two hypotheses to be tested are summarized below.

H1: Early entry prior to loss of exclusivity, has a significant, negative effect on subsequent, independent generic entry (deterrence effect).

H2: Trademarks significantly intensify the deterrence effect of early entry on subsequent, independent generic entry (signaling effect).

Both generic entry and early entry are dichotomous variables. One observes entry but not the profits the generic firm or early entrant expected to reap upon entry (latent variable), which in turn motivated the firm's entry decision. Given that observed and unobserved factors³² determine expected market profits and, as a result both the likelihood of generic and early entry, it is essential to account and test for the endogeneity of early entry when examining its impact. If early entry is endogenous, its effect is likely to become understated as early entrants possibly focus on the more profitable entry opportunities. The selection effect may counterbalance the presumably negative early entry effect. In the first step – ignoring any endogeneity issues –, we estimate a probit model to examine the effect of early entry (ee_i) on generic entry (g_i) in market i (first specification). For the purpose of identifying a correlation between generic entry and early entry over the error terms and providing evidence for selection, we estimate a recursive bivariate probit model in the second step.³³ In the recursive bivariate probit model early entry is instrumented for, i.e. we simultaneously estimate an early entry equation in addition to the generic entry equation. In the presence of a significantly (positive) correlation between the two equations, early entry is to be considered endogenous. Generic entry decisions effectively occur simultaneously due to the lengthy entry process, even though early entry and generic entry will occur sequentially.³⁴ If markets are highly attractive they will attract both generic and early entrants (see Table 1). If generic firms correctly anticipate early entry they will potentially be discouraged to enter if incentives are being lowered substantially. In this line of reasoning, we include the

³²If future, therapeutic innovations are expected to change the competitive landscape, entry into a certain market may be less attractive than observed market characteristics suggest. On the contrary, long-term clinical studies may reveal that a substance is particularly effective in a (different) field, and entry is more attractive. Demographic trend projections possibly affect expected profits additionally.

³³Evans and Schwab (1995) adopt this empirical approach in a seminal paper among the first.

³⁴With patent holders' permission early entrants may launch products any time prior to loss of exclusivity.

early entry dummy in the generic entry equation and not vice versa. A trademark dummy is finally interacted with the early entry dummy (ee_tm_i) and added to the probit and recursive bivariate probit models' first generic entry specification in order to estimate the impact of trademarks on the particular size of the early entry effect (second specification). The value of the *Branded Early Entry* dummy equals one whenever early entrants have registered trademarks for the name(s) of products they launched up front. Potential endogeneity issues with respect to early entrants' trademark activities are abstracted from in both the probit and recursive bivariate probit model. In a recursive trivariate probit model we finally attempt to account and test for the endogeneity of both early entry and branded early entry.

Factors such as pre-entry market size, monopoly duration and the number of off-patent substitute active ingredients obviously affect the likelihood of generic entry, and need to be controlled for (co-variates \mathbf{X}^{35}). As firm characteristics – in particular the experience in a therapeutic field or with a particular drug form – have also been shown to strongly influence generic entry decisions (Morton, 1999), potential entrants' therapeutic field experience and drug form experience will be accounted for as well (capability \mathbf{C}). Generic entry decisions are likely not to be independent on firm-level, thus observations are clustered over firms and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are adjusted accordingly. The probit model with the two specifications to be estimated is the following:

$$g_i = 1[g_i^* > 0] \quad \text{where} \quad g_i^* = \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{C}\boldsymbol{\alpha} + \delta ee_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$g_i = 1[g_i^* > 0] \quad \text{where} \quad g_i^* = \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{C}\boldsymbol{\alpha} + \delta ee_i + \gamma ee_tm_i + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

In contrast to the probit model, the recursive bivariate probit model allows for the possibility that unobserved determinants of generic entry and early entry are correlated. The error terms ϵ_i and μ_i are assumed to be distributed bivariate normal, with $E(\epsilon_i) = E(\mu_i) = 0$, $Var(\epsilon_i) = Var(\mu_i) = 1$ and $Cov(\epsilon_i, \mu_i) = \rho$. Early entry is now being instrumented for and generic entry (g_i) and early entry (ee_i) equations are estimated simultaneously with standard errors being again clustered and heteroscedasticity-robust. In order to allow for identification, we add four variables (identifiers \mathbf{I}) to the early entry equation which shall explain early entry but should have no direct impact on generic entry decisions: *Patent holder*, *Revenue Share*, *Revenue Pipeline* and *Revenue Loss*. Econometricians (Heckman, 1978; Wilde, 2000) argue that exclusion restrictions are not necessarily required in simultaneous equation systems with endogenous dummy regressors to achieve identification given there is at least one exogenous regressor that shows sufficient variation. Nevertheless, we have attempted to find variables which promise to provide valid exclusion restrictions on theoretical grounds.³⁶ The bivariate probit model's specifications to be estimated are outlined below:

$$g_i = 1[g_i^* > 0] \quad \text{where} \quad g_i^* = \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{C}\boldsymbol{\alpha} + \delta ee_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$ee_i = 1[ee_i^* > 0] \quad \text{where} \quad ee_i^* = \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{I}\boldsymbol{\tau} + \mu_i$$

$$g_i = 1[g_i^* > 0] \quad \text{where} \quad g_i^* = \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{C}\boldsymbol{\alpha} + \delta ee_i + \gamma ee_tm_i + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

$$ee_i = 1[ee_i^* > 0] \quad \text{where} \quad ee_i^* = \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{I}\boldsymbol{\tau} + \mu_i$$

³⁵The matrix \mathbf{X} also includes therapeutic field, drug form and year dummies.

³⁶A test of over-identifying-restrictions is not feasible given the dichotomy of both generic and early entry.

The recursive trivariate probit model’s structure is similar. Whereas the recursive bivariate probit model has two equations, the recursive trivariate probit model incorporates three equations (g_i , ee_i , ee_tm_i) and allows for the possibility that unobserved determinants of generic entry, early entry and branded early entry are correlated. The error terms ϵ_i , μ_i and ν_i are assumed to be distributed trivariate normal, with $E(\epsilon_i) = E(\mu_i) = E(\nu_i) = 0$, $Var(\epsilon_i) = Var(\mu_i) = Var(\nu_i) = 1$, $Cov(\epsilon_i, \mu_i) = \rho_{12}$, $Cov(\epsilon_i, \nu_i) = \rho_{13}$ and $Cov(\mu_i, \nu_i) = \rho_{23}$. Given the simultaneity of early entry and branded early entry³⁷ we use the same instruments in the early entry and branded early entry equation, i.e. we do assume that we achieve identification through sufficient variation in exogenous regressors. The recursive trivariate probit model to be estimated is the following (second specification):

$$\begin{aligned} g_i &= 1[g_i^* > 0] & \text{where} & & g_i^* &= \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{C}\boldsymbol{\alpha} + \delta ee_i + \gamma ee_tm_i + \epsilon_i & (2) \\ ee_i &= 1[ee_i^* > 0] & \text{where} & & ee_i^* &= \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{I}\boldsymbol{\tau} + \mu_i \\ ee_tm_i &= 1[ee_tm_i^* > 0] & \text{where} & & ee_tm_i^* &= \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{I}\boldsymbol{\tau} + \nu_i \end{aligned}$$

The dependent variable of interest – *Generic Entry* – is defined as market entry of an independent generic firm after substances’ loss of exclusivity and is coded as 0-1 dummy. If a generic subsidiary or licensee partner of the original drug producer entered a market prior to loss of exclusivity (early entry), the according *Early Entry* dummy regressor takes on the value one. If early entrants launch products under a new tradename for which a trademark has been registered for, the *Branded Early Entry* dummy is additionally coded as one. The variable *Pre-Entry Market Size* is defined as the logged annual revenue in a given market two calendar years prior to loss of exclusivity, which are evaluated at producer prices and given in € Mio. We use a lagged variable to account for the fact that entry decisions are made earlier in time. Previous studies have shown that the effective duration of monopoly has a negative effect on generic entry, mainly arguing that original drug producers’ goodwill stocks are larger (Hurwitz and Caves, 1988; Hudson, 2000). We add *Monopoly Duration* as variable to generic entry and early entry equations, measuring the number of years from the original drug producer’s first market approval to loss of exclusivity. *Substitutes* – the number of off-patent substitute active ingredients – is included as another covariate in generic entry and early entry equations where one would expect a negative correlation with entry. Whenever an off-patent substance falls into the same ATC2 group(s) a particular substance is listed in, it is counted as a substitute³⁸. As a proxy for potential entrants’ therapeutic experience we use the number of retail forms the firm has launched prior to loss of exclusivity in the therapeutic field(s) the substances is used in. Similarly, we use the number of retail forms the firm has marketed, which use the same route(s) of administration as the particular substance, as a proxy for drug form experience. To account for possible non-linear effects of experience the square of each variable is also included in the generic entry equations.

As an instrument we use the dummy variable *Patent holder* which is assigned a value of one when original drug producers are the holders of the patent that protects the compound and not only licensees thereof. If original drug producers own the relevant patent(s) they

³⁷One may observe branded early entry only if early entry occurred.

³⁸Of course, substances in the same ATC2 class are not necessarily perfect substitutes. Nevertheless, this variable should at least proxy for the degree of competition in a certain therapeutic field.

can directly decide upon early entry arrangements, i.e. they have the decision power and transaction costs are lower.³⁹ Thus, one would expect a positive effect on early entry. The attractiveness of a market, however, does not seem to be impaired by the fact that original drug producers possess or license the relevant patent(s) protecting the compound in question. Early entries are likely to be motivated by original drug producers' financial need. For this reason, we include the variables *Revenue Share*, *Revenue Pipeline* and *Revenues Losses* as further instruments in the early entry equation. *Revenue Share* indicates the substances' share in original drug producers' total annual revenues in the year of loss of exclusivity. *Revenue Pipeline* measures the total annual market revenue with patent-protected substances original drug producers' generate in the year substances' exclusivity expires. *Revenues Losses* lastly sums up other revenue losses original drug producers face due to losses of exclusivity in the time period 2002-2007. Early entries are assumed to be less likely when original drug producers are finally well-off. Again, we argue that original drug producers' financial need has no direct impact on generic entry decisions. It influences generic entry indirectly only in that it affects the likelihood of early entry which in turn impacts generic entry. Therapeutic field (ATC1 Classification), drug form (NFC1 Classification), and year dummies are finally included in all generic entry and early entry equations to account for field, drug form and year fixed effects.⁴⁰ A summary of definitions is provided in table 3 below. The distribution of variables differs in the three data sets given that the number of "zero-entries" is lower in second and third data set. The fraction of generic entries, early entries and brand early entries increases from data set 1 to data set 3 respectively. One should note, that the mean and median therapeutic field and drug form experiences increase with a restriction to therapeutic and drug form experienced firms from data set 1 to data set 3. An overview of the according summary statistics is presented in Appendix [A1]–[A3].

³⁹In the 16 markets affected by early entry, only two original drug producers were licensees in fact.

⁴⁰Parasitology and sense organs as therapeutic fields, ophthalmologic or lung administration as drug forms, and the year 2002 as year of loss of exclusivity, form the reference group.

Table 3: Definition of Variables

Variable Name	Definition
Generic Entry	0-1 dummy variable,=1 if generic firm entered market after substance's loss of exclusivity.
Early Entry	0-1 dummy variable,=1 if early entry occurred prior to substance's loss of exclusivity.
Branded Early Entry	0-1 dummy variable,=1 if early entry occurred prior substance's loss of exclusivity, with the early entrant's product(s) being trademark-protected.
Pre-Entry Market Size (log)	Annual market revenue two calendar years prior to loss of exclusivity, in €Mio., evaluated at producer prices and log taken.
Monopoly Duration	Number of years from original drug's first market approval to loss of exclusivity.
Substitutes	Number of off-patent substitute active ingredients – substances in the same ATC2 class – at the time exclusivity expires.
Field Experience	Number of retail forms a potential entrant has launched in those therapeutic field(s) the substance exposed to loss of exclusivity is used in (ATC2 Classification).
Field Experience ²	Square of Field Experience
Form Experience	Number of retail forms a potential entrant has marketed, which use the same route(s) of administration as the substance exposed to loss of exclusivity (NFC2 Classification).
Form Experience ²	Square of Form Experience.
Patent holder	0-1 dummy variable,=1 if original drug producer holds the patent(s) protecting the compound in question, and not a marketing license only.
Revenue Share	Substances' share in original drug producers' total annual revenues in the year exclusivity is lost (revenues measured in €Mio. and evaluated at producer prices).
Revenue Pipeline (log)	Original drug producers' total annual market revenue with patent-protected substances in the year exclusivity is lost, in €Mio., evaluated at producer prices and log taken.
Revenue Losses (log)	Sum of other revenue losses (pre-entry market sizes) original drug producers face due to losses of exclusivity in the time period 2002-2007.
Therap. Field	0-1 dummy variable,=1 if substance is used in Therapeutical Field (ATC1 Classification: 13 classes/dummies).
Drug Form	0-1 dummy variable,=1 if substance is administered in particular drug form (NFC1 classification: 10 classes/dummies).
Year Expiry	0-1 dummy variable,=1 if loss of exclusivity occurred in given year (2002-2007).

5 Results

In the first instance we estimate a probit model – completely ignoring any selection problems that may exist – and examine the impact of early entries and trademarks on independent generic entry. We estimate two probit specifications for each of the three data sets that we have generated. An overview of the estimated coefficients is given in table 4 below. Overall, estimates are very similar, even though sample size drops notably from data set 1 to data set 3. Probit estimates indicate that early entry has a significantly negative effect on generic entry (Spec.1). However, as soon as the *Branded Early Entry* dummy is included in the generic entry equation (Spec.2), the effect of *Early Entry* becomes insignificant. The coefficient of *Branded Early Entry* is significantly negative and in absolute terms larger than the coefficient of *Early Entry* in Spec.1. This result suggests that the presumed deterrence effect of early entry is to be attributed to early entrants with a trademark and product differentiation strategy. First mover advantages alone do not explain deterrence (*H1*), and trademarks appear not to intensify (*H2*) but to facilitate the deterrence effect of early entry. Moreover, we find that generic entry decisions are strongly driven by substances’ pre-entry market size. The number of off-patent substitutes in turn has a significant, negative impact on generic entry. Both therapeutic and drug form experiences have a significantly positive (linear⁴¹) effect on generic entry. The coefficients of *Field Experience* and *Form Experience* become smaller from data set 1 to data set 3, though. By restricting the sets of potential entrants to firms experienced in the relevant therapeutic fields and the manufacture of relevant drug forms, firm experience seems to have less explanatory power. These findings mainly confirm the results obtained in prior empirical studies on generic entry. A somewhat striking result is the significantly positive effect of *Monopoly Duration*. One explanation is that monopoly duration is not necessarily a good proxy for the goodwill original drug producers have accumulated over the years but another market value correlate. If a market is very valuable, original drug producers’ incentives to obtain and retain monopoly power will be larger. In such a case, one could imagine that original drug producers either attempt to speed up the time to market entry or seek to prolong the market exclusivity period through spc extensions, for instance. Therapeutic field, drug form and year effects are significant in all specifications.

Strictly speaking, if early entry (or branded early entry) is endogenous, a probit model will be misspecified, potentially underestimating the early entry effect(s). In order to account and test for the potential endogeneity of *Early Entry* we estimate a recursive bivariate probit model in the second step. The results of the recursive bivariate probit regressions are presented in Appendix [B1]–[B3]. Alike the probit regressions, we subsequently add the *Branded Early Entry* dummy regressor to the generic entry equations (Spec.2) and estimate the two specifications for each of the three data sets at hand. *Early Entry* – the variable possibly affected by selection – is now instrumented for by the variables *Patent holder*, *Revenue Share*, *Revenue Pipeline* and *Revenue Losses*. Apart from the dummy variable *Patent holder*, the instruments have the expected sign, and they are all significant. The correlation coefficient ρ is insignificant in all bivariate probit regressions at a minimum significance level of 5%. Moreover, as soon as the *Branded Early Entry* is added to the generic entry equations

⁴¹The linearity of the experience effects is likely driven by the small unit of measurement (retail forms).

(Spec.2) the significance of both *Early Entry* and ρ typically deteriorates⁴². Hence, we find no evidence for a selection problem which was assumed to lead to an understatement of the early entry effect whenever selection is not accounted for. The coefficients of *Monopoly Duration*, *Substitutes*, *Field Experience* and *Form Experience* in the generic entry equations practically remain the same. Only the coefficients of *Pre-Entry Market Size* increase slightly in comparison to the probit estimates. Yet, the sign of all coefficients and their statistical significance is generally robust to the variation in the choice of econometric model. Therapeutic field, drug form and year effects are again statistically significant. To be on the safe side, we account and test for the endogeneity of not only *Early Entry* but also *Branded Early Entry*, estimating a recursive trivariate model⁴³ in the third and last step. The results of the recursive trivariate probit regressions are similar, i.e. we find no statistically significant correlation between the early entry and generic entry (ρ_{12}) or branded early entry and generic entry (ρ_{13}) equations, and thus no evidence for selection. The correlation between the early entry and branded early entry (ρ_{23}) equations is almost perfect (by definition) and significant. An overview of data set 3 regression estimates is provided in Appendix [C].⁴⁴

In summary, bivariate and trivariate probit estimates suggest that there is no selection problem associated with the occurrence of early or branded early entry. As a consequence, probit regressions provide consistent estimates of the effect of early entries and trademarks on generic entry. Table 5 below presents the marginal effects obtained from the probit regressions (Spec.2) which will allow for a more accurate assessment of the *Branded Early Entry* effect and its economic importance. In the light of empirical evidence affirming the positive influence of therapeutic and drug form experience on generic entry decisions, we confine the interpretation of marginal effects to the results obtained for data set 3. Data set 3 comprises firms with the relevant therapeutic and drug form experiences as potential entry candidates, thus giving the most realistic picture of actual occurrences. The marginal effect of *Branded Early Entry* amounts to -0.0153, implying that the probability of generic entry is reduced by about 1.5% at the mean. The average marginal effect in turn amounts to -0.0706, i.e. the probability of generic entry is reduced by about 7% on average. Given a sample average entry probability of roundabout 19%, the joint effect of early entries and trademarks on generic entry is sizeable. However, the main drive of generic entry is *Pre-entry Market Size*. With a marginal effect of 3.3% and an average marginal effect of 12%, this factor counterbalances the deterrence effect of *Branded Early Entry* most of the time. The entry probability increases by 0.1%/0.06% on average with one retail form more potential entrants have marketed in the relevant therapeutic field(s)/drug form(s) prior to substances' loss of exclusivity. An increase of the number of off-patent substances by one reduces the entry probability by about 0.2% on average. In summary, *Branded Early Entry* appears to have a comparably large and economically important effect on average which only *Pre-entry Market Size* dominates. Given that early entrants focus on high-revenue markets we posit that anticipated *Branded Early Entry* will typically not deter generic firms from entry.

⁴²Compare the probability level at which the Null Hypothesis can be rejected (Wald Test of $\rho = 0$).

⁴³The maximum likelihood estimation involves the integration of trivariate joint normal probabilities either through numerical integration or simulation. Severe convergence problems are typical. In order to achieve convergence we had to exclude all dummies from the early entry and branded early entry equations.

⁴⁴The results for data set 1 and data set 2 are similar and can be obtained from the author upon request.

Table 4: Generic Entry: Probit – Coefficients

<i>Independent Variables</i>	Data Set 1 (N=15592)		Data Set 2 (N=4548)		Data Set 3 (N=4010)	
	<i>Generic Entry</i>		<i>Generic Entry</i>		<i>Generic Entry</i>	
	<i>Spec.1</i>	<i>Spec.2</i>	<i>Spec.1</i>	<i>Spec.2</i>	<i>Spec.1</i>	<i>Spec.2</i>
Early Entry (0/1)	-0.1307** (0.050)	0.0051 (0.053)	-0.1368* (0.063)	0.0086 (0.065)	-0.1267* (0.064)	0.0469 (0.067)
Branded Early Entry (0/1)		-0.3479*** (0.072)		-0.3866*** (0.087)		-0.4586*** (0.090)
Pre-Entry Market Size (log)	0.5615*** (0.045)	0.6032*** (0.051)	0.6355*** (0.049)	0.6699*** (0.053)	0.6530*** (0.050)	0.6973*** (0.055)
Monopoly Duration	0.0464*** (0.012)	0.0384** (0.012)	0.0600*** (0.014)	0.0526*** (0.014)	0.0541*** (0.015)	0.0446** (0.015)
Substitutes	-0.0042** (0.001)	-0.0045** (0.001)	-0.0082*** (0.002)	-0.0085*** (0.002)	-0.0087*** (0.002)	-0.0092*** (0.002)
Field Experience	0.0207*** (0.002)	0.0210*** (0.002)	0.0075** (0.002)	0.0076** (0.002)	0.0064* (0.002)	0.0066** (0.003)
Field Experience ²	-0.0001*** (1.1e-05)	-0.0001*** (1.1e-05)	-1.1e-05 (8.38e-06)	-1.2e-05 (8.50e-06)	-8.62e-06 (8.53e-06)	-9.05e-06 (8.65e-06)
Form Experience	0.0051*** (0.001)	0.0052*** (0.001)	0.0038*** (0.001)	0.0038*** (0.001)	0.0037*** (0.001)	0.0037*** (0.001)
Form Experience ²	-2.21e-06*** (4.97e-07)	-2.24e-06*** (5.01e-07)	-1.09e-06 (6.80e-07)	-1.13e-06 (6.80e-07)	-9.96e-07 (6.82e-07)	-1.04e-06 (6.82e-07)
Therap. Field (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Drug Form (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Year Expiry (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Const.	-10.8859***	-11.3282***	-11.1560***	-11.5209***	-11.0474***	-11.4994***
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log-Likelihood	-1682.32	-1676.73	-1289.70	-1285.16	-1241.86	-1235.74

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Notes: An observation in the regression is the decision of a generic firm to enter a market after substances' loss of exclusivity (generic entry). Heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5: Generic Entry: Probit (Spec.2) – Marginal Effects

<i>Independent Variables</i>	Data Set 1 (N=15592)		Data Set 2 (N=4548)		Data Set 3 (N=4010)	
	<i>Generic Entry</i>		<i>Generic Entry</i>		<i>Generic Entry</i>	
	<i>Marg. Effect</i>	<i>Avg. Marg. Effect</i>	<i>Marg. Effect</i>	<i>Avg. Marg. Effect</i>	<i>Marg. Effect</i>	<i>Avg. Marg. Effect</i>
Early Entry (0/1)	1.08e-05 (1.1e-04)	0.0003 (0.003)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.0013 (0.010)	0.0023 (0.004)	0.0081 (0.012)
Branded Early Entry (0/1)	-0.0005* (1.9e-04)	-0.0175*** (0.004)	-0.0107*** (0.003)	-0.0550*** (0.012)	-0.0153*** (0.004)	-0.0706*** (0.013)
Pre-Entry Market Size (log)	0.0013** (4.25e-04)	0.0343*** (0.004)	0.0260*** (0.005)	0.1056*** (0.010)	0.0337*** (0.006)	0.1201*** (0.011)
Monopoly Duration	0.0001* (3.53e-05)	0.0022** (0.001)	0.0020** (0.001)	0.0083*** (0.002)	0.0022** (0.001)	0.0077** (0.003)
Substitutes	-9.47e-06* (4.02e-06)	-0.0003** (7.56e-05)	-0.0003*** (7.96e-05)	-0.0013*** (2.45e-04)	-0.0004*** (9.98e-05)	-0.0016*** (2.72e-04)
Field Experience	4.41e-05** (1.53e-05)	0.0012*** (1.45e-04)	0.0003** (9.29e-05)	0.0012** (3.62e-04)	0.0003** (1.2e-04)	0.0011** (4.1e-04)
Field Experience ²	-1.24e-07** (4.75e-08)	-3.36e-06*** (6.65e-07)	-4.45e-07 (3.19e-07)	-1.86e-06 (1.30e-06)	-4.38e-07 (4.10e-07)	-1.56e-06 (1.46e-06)
Form Experience	1.1e-05** (3.79e-06)	0.0003*** (3.96e-05)	0.0001*** (3.65e-05)	0.0006*** (1.2e-04)	0.0002*** (4.39e-05)	0.0006*** (1.3e-04)
Form Experience ²	-4.70e-09** (1.70e-09)	-1.27e-07*** (2.73e-08)	-4.40e-08 (2.62e-08)	-1.79e-07* (8.81e-08)	-5.03e-08 (3.27e-08)	-1.79e-07 (9.58e-08)

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Notes: At the mean, *Pre-entry Market Size*, *Monopoly Duration* and *Substitutes* amount to 16.0 (or € 32.1 Mio.), 11.92 and 57.5 respectively. *Field experience* and *Form experience* amount to 24.1 and 148.1 on average.

6 Conclusion

We establish evidence that the presumed deterrence effect of early entry is to be attributed to early entrants with a trademark strategy (branded early entry). The average deterrence effect is sizeable but dominated by the effect of pre-entry market size. As early entrants target high-revenue markets, we posit that anticipated branded early entry will typically not impair generic entry. Some authors argue that anticipated early entry – also known as authorized, branded or pseudo-generic entry – has an anti-competitive, deterring effect on generic entry. First-mover advantages are said to be important and non-transitory in the generic market segment, such that anticipated early entry will lower subsequent generic entrants’ incentives to enter substantially. Trademarks, in turn, have been shown to be positively correlated with sales and market share, i.e. they turn out to be a means of strengthening market positions. Given that early entrants often embark on trademark strategies, we test for generic entry deterrence and examine the joint, presumably complementary impact of early entries and trademarks on independent generic entry. Based on a unique pharmaceutical data set, exclusivity and trademark data, we have examined generic entry decisions in Germany within the time period 2002-2007. Estimating a probit model, recursive bivariate and recursive trivariate probit model, we test for entry deterrence and the potential endogeneity of the early entry dummy regressors. Treating early entry or branded early entry as exogenous variables (probit model) could give rise to a selection problem and inconsistent estimates if early entry or branded early entry occurred in markets that are more attractive than given market characteristics suggest. Bivariate and trivariate probit estimates suggest that there is no selection problem associated with the occurrence of early or branded early entry, such that probit estimates are consistent. We find that first mover advantages alone do not explain deterrence, and that trademark protection does not intensify but facilitate the deterrence effect of early entry. The effect of branded early entry is significantly negative in all specifications, reducing the probability of generic entry by 7% on average. With an average marginal effect of 12% pre-entry market size is the dominant driver of generic entry, suggesting that anticipated branded early entry will not impair generic entry in the high-revenue markets that early entrants focus on. The number of off-patent substitute active ingredients has a negative impact on entry. In turn, firms’ therapeutic and drug form experience appear to influence generic entry decisions positively. Given the main finding of this study that branded early entry has a negative but not momentous effect on generic entry, we posit that welfare effects are likely to be small. Further research is warranted to clarify what effects early entries and trademark protection have on the extent of generic entry, generic prices, generic drug prescriptions or the assortment of retail forms in off-patent markets. These are important areas of research which we intend to examine in the future.

Appendix

[A-1] Summary Statistics Data Set1

Variable Name	Mean	Median	Min.	Max.	Sd.	N
Generic Entry	0.05	0	0	1	–	15592
Early Entry	0.20	0	0	1	–	15592
Branded Early Entry	0.08	0	0	1	–	15592
Pre-Entry Market Size	32.1	14.7	0	187	41.0	15592
Pre-Entry Market Size (log)	15.74	16.51	0	19.05	3.35	15592
Monopoly Duration	12.06	12.5	5	20	3.23	15592
Substitutes	50.27	41	9	205	38.25	15592
Field Experience	6.58	0	0	374	20.91	15592
Form Experience	56.87	13	0	1679	125.86	15592
Patent holder	0.84	1	0	1	–	15592
Revenue Share	0.09	0.01	0	1	0.23	15592
Revenues Pipeline	377	282	0	3120	542	15592
Revenues Pipeline (log)	15.42	19.46	0	21.86	7.44	15592
Revenue Losses	93.5	86.9	0	282	87.1	15592
Revenue Losses (log)	14.05	18.27	0	19.46	7.70	15592

[A-2] Summary Statistics Data Set2

Variable Name	Mean	Median	Min.	Max.	Sd.	N
Generic Entry	0.17	0	0	1	–	4548
Early Entry	0.22	0	0	1	–	4548
Branded Early Entry	0.08	0	0	1	–	4548
Pre-Entry Market Size	36.1	17.1	0	187	43.6	4548
Pre-Entry Market Size (log)	15.97	16.66	0	19.05	3.20	4548
Monopoly Duration	12.11	12.5	5	20	3.23	4548
Substitutes	57.43	45	9	205	38.33	4548
Field Experience	22.57	10	0	374	33.73	4548
Form Experience	134.80	56	0	1679	196.71	4548
Patent holder	0.83	1	0	1	–	4548
Revenue Share	0.10	0.01	0	1	0.22	4548
Revenues Pipeline	365	240	0	3120	561	4548
Revenues Pipeline (log)	14.87	19.30	0	21.86	7.87	4548
Revenue Losses	90.5	88.1	0	282	83.8	4548
Revenue Losses (log)	13.80	18.29	0	19.46	7.88	4548

[A-3] Summary Statistics Data Set3

Variable Name	Mean	Median	Min.	Max.	Sd.	N
Generic Entry	0.19	0	0	1	–	4010
Early Entry	0.23	0	0	1	–	4010
Branded Early Entry	0.09	0	0	1	–	4010
Pre-Entry Market Size	36.7	20.1	0	187	43.7	4010
Pre-Entry Market Size (log)	16.00	16.82	0	19.05	3.26	4010
Monopoly Duration	11.92	12.5	5	20	3.06	4010
Substitutes	57.46	45	9	205	39.33	4010
Field Experience	24.05	11	0	374	34.88	4010
Form Experience	148.10	66	0	1679	204.44	4010
Patent holder	0.83	1	0	1	–	4010
Revenue Share	0.10	0.02	0	1	0.23	4010
Revenues Pipeline	377	240	0	3120	587	4010
Revenues Pipeline (log)	14.76	19.30	0	21.86	7.95	4010
Revenue Losses	91.8	88.1	0	282	84.9	4010
Revenue Losses (log)	13.60	18.29	0	19.46	8.05	4010

[B-1] Generic Entry: Bivariate Probit (Coefficients)

<i>Independent Variables</i>	Data Set 1 (N=15592)			
	<i>Generic Entry</i>	<i>Early Entry</i>	<i>Generic Entry</i>	<i>Early Entry</i>
	<i>Spec.1</i>		<i>Spec.2</i>	
Early Entry (0/1)	-0.1513 (0.116)		0.1384 (0.137)	
Branded Early Entry (0/1)			-0.3768*** (0.075)	
Pre-Entry Market Size (log)	0.5653*** (0.051)	0.8155*** (0.004)	0.5831*** (0.054)	0.8150*** (0.004)
Monopoly Duration	0.0458*** (0.012)	0.0319*** (0.001)	0.0419** (0.012)	0.0307*** (0.001)
Substitutes	-0.0043* (0.001)	-0.0149*** (8.67e-05)	-0.0039** (0.001)	-0.0149*** (8.63e-05)
Field Experience	0.0208*** (0.002)		0.0210*** (0.002)	
Field Experience ²	-5.83e-05*** (1.1e-05)		-5.87e-05*** (1.1e-05)	
Form Experience	0.0051*** (0.001)		0.0052*** (0.001)	
Form Experience ²	-2.21e-06*** (4.97e-07)		-2.24e-06*** (5.00e-07)	
Patent holder (0/1)		-1.2118*** (0.014)		-1.2033*** (0.014)
Revenue Share		1.4093*** (0.031)		1.4120*** (0.033)
Revenue Pipeline (log)		-0.1012*** (0.001)		-0.1007*** (0.001)
Revenue Losses (log)		0.3469*** (0.001)		0.3468*** (0.001)
Therap. Field (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Drug Form (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Year Expiry (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Const.	-10.9458***	-21.1865***	-11.0042***	-21.1781***
Prob > chi2		0.0000		0.0000
Log-Likelihood		-4856.29		-4850.34
ρ		0.0169		-0.1009
Wald Test ($\rho = 0$)		0.8437		0.3249

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Notes: An observation in the regression is the decision of a generic firm to enter a market after substances' loss of exclusivity (generic entry). In columns (2) and (4) early entry is treated as endogenous and instrumented by. Heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.

[B-2] Generic Entry: Bivariate Probit (Coefficients)

<i>Independent Variables</i>	Data Set 2 (N=4548)			
	<i>Generic Entry</i>	<i>Early Entry</i>	<i>Generic Entry</i>	<i>Early Entry</i>
	<u><i>Spec.1</i></u>		<u><i>Spec.2</i></u>	
Early Entry (0/1)	-0.3665*		-0.0910	
	(0.154)		(0.170)	
Branded Early Entry (0/1)			-0.3625***	
			(0.087)	
Pre-Entry Market Size (log)	0.6804***	0.7416***	0.6862***	0.7419***
	(0.061)	(0.023)	(0.063)	(0.023)
Monopoly Duration	0.0584***	0.0822***	0.0523***	0.0792***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Substitutes	-0.0093***	-0.0165***	-0.0090***	-0.0165***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Field Experience	0.0075**		0.0076**	
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
Field Experience ²	-1.15e-05		-1.16e-05	
	(8.44e-06)		(8.52e-06)	
Form Experience	0.0038***		0.0038***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Form Experience ²	-1.08e-06		-1.13e-06	
	(6.76e-07)		(6.78e-07)	
Patent holder (0/1)		-1.0110***		-0.9875***
		(0.068)		(0.065)
Revenue Share		1.6216***		1.5877***
		(0.161)		(0.161)
Revenue Pipeline (log)		-0.0997***		-0.0995***
		(0.006)		(0.007)
Revenue Losses (log)		0.3153***		0.3150***
		(0.009)		(0.009)
Therap. Field (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Drug Form (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Year Expiry (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Const.	-11.8756***	-19.7039***	-11.7905***	-19.6831***
Prob > chi2		0.0000		0.0000
Log-Likelihood		-2236.16		-2232.57
ρ		0.1866		0.0735
Wald Test ($\rho = 0$)		0.0841		0.5191

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Notes: An observation in the regression is the decision of a generic firm to enter a market after substances' loss of exclusivity (generic entry). In columns (2) and (4) early entry is treated as endogenous and instrumented by. Heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.

[B-3] Generic Entry: Bivariate Probit (Coefficients)

<i>Independent Variables</i>	Data Set 3 (N=4010)			
	<i>Generic Entry</i>	<i>Early Entry</i>	<i>Generic Entry</i>	<i>Early Entry</i>
	<i>Spec.1</i>		<i>Spec.2</i>	
Early Entry (0/1)	-0.3362*		-0.0027	
	(0.147)		(0.159)	
Branded Early Entry (0/1)			-0.4465***	
			(0.089)	
Pre-Entry Market Size (log)	0.6964***	0.7432***	0.7059***	0.7428***
	(0.061)	(0.023)	(0.063)	(0.022)
Monopoly Duration	0.0532***	0.1088***	0.0446**	0.1054***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Substitutes	-0.0098***	-0.0169***	-0.0094***	-0.0169***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Field Experience	0.0066**		0.0066**	
	(0.003)		(0.003)	
Field Experience ²	-9.09e-06		-9.14e-06	
	(8.58e-06)		(8.66e-06)	
Form Experience	0.0036***		0.0037***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Form Experience ²	-9.83e-07		-1.04e-06	
	(6.80e-07)		(6.82e-07)	
Patent holder (0/1)		-1.1268***		-1.0990***
		(0.067)		(0.064)
Revenue Share		1.8722***		1.8374***
		(0.168)		(0.167)
Revenue Pipeline (log)		-0.0992***		-0.0988***
		(0.006)		(0.006)
Revenue Losses (log)		0.3239***		0.3237***
		(0.009)		(0.009)
Therap. Field (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Drug Form (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Year Expiry (0/1)	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Const.	-11.7679***	-20.1961***	-11.6480***	-20.1723***
Prob > chi2		0.0000		0.0000
Log-Likelihood		-2115.51		-2110.29
ρ		0.1718		0.0369
Wald Test ($\rho = 0$)		0.0959		0.7308

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Notes: An observation in the regression is the decision of a generic firm to enter a market after substances' loss of exclusivity (generic entry). In columns (2) and (4) early entry is treated as endogenous and instrumented by. Heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.

[C] Generic Entry: Trivariate Probit (Coefficients)

<i>Independent Variables</i>	Data Set 3 (N=4010)		
	<i>Generic Entry</i>	<i>Early Entry</i>	<i>Branded Early Entry</i>
Early Entry (0/1)	-0.044 (0.086)		
Branded Early Entry (0/1)	-0.5429*** (0.100)		
Pre-Entry Market Size (log)	0.6957*** (0.047)	0.4038*** (0.019)	0.4082*** (0.027)
Monopoly Duration	0.0361** (0.014)	0.0923*** (0.009)	0.2984*** (0.015)
Substitutes	-0.0065*** (0.001)	0.0003 (4.0e-04)	-0.0105*** (0.001)
Field Experience	0.0045* (0.002)		
Field Experience ²	-2.41e-06 (7.74e-06)		
Form Experience	0.0038*** (0.001)		
Form Experience ²	-9.95e-07 (6.79e-07)		
Patent holder (0/1)		-0.6767*** (0.046)	-3.1629*** (0.101)
Revenue Share (0/1)		4.9029*** (0.180)	20.4820*** (0.816)
Revenue Pipeline (log)		0.0313*** (0.004)	0.3570*** (0.021)
Revenue Losses (log)		0.3654*** (0.010)	1.7072*** (0.072)
Therap. Field (0/1)	<i>yes</i>		
Drug Form (0/1)	<i>yes</i>		
Year Expiry (0/1)	<i>yes</i>		
Const.	-11.9484***	-18.1522***	-91.9278***
Prob > chi2		0.0000	
Log-Likelihood		-2891.80	
$\rho_{12} / \rho_{13} / \rho_{23}$	0.0729	0.0529	0.9943***
Wald Test ($\rho_{12} = \rho_{13} = \rho_{23} = 0$)		0.0000	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Notes: An observation in the regression is the decision of a generic firm to enter a market after substances' loss of exclusivity (generic entry). In columns (2) and (3) early entry and branded early entry are treated as endogenous and instrumented by. Heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.

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